Notes

Article 1: Investigates whether good (bonum) differs in reality from being (ens).
Objection 1:
Quotes Boethius' statement that "it is one thing for them to be good and another for them to exist," implying that good and being differ in reality.
Objection 2:
Argues that good is predicated as a form, while being is not, suggesting a real difference between the two.
Objection 3:
Points out that good admits of more and less, while being does not, indicating a difference in reality.
Contrary statement:
Augustine's statement that "to the extent that we exist, we are good" implies that good and being are the same in reality.
Response:
Maintains that good and being are the same in reality and differ only conceptually, as the nature of good is to be desirable, and something is desirable to the extent that it has actuality.
Reply to Objection 1:
Explains that while good and being are the same in reality, they differ conceptually, and something is not called unqualifiedly good in the same way that it is called unqualifiedly a being.
Reply to Objection 2:
Clarifies that good is predicated as a form insofar as it means unqualifiedly good, by virtue of its ultimate act.
Reply to Objection 3:
States that the difference in degree in good is due to some supervening actuality, such as scientific knowledge or virtue.

Article 2: Discusses the question of whether the concept of "good" is conceptually prior to "being."
Objection 1:
Arguments that the order of names in Dionysius' work, De Divinibus Nominibus, implies that good is conceptually prior to being.
Objection 2:
Arguments that good extends to more things than being, as it applies to both existing and non-existing things, making it conceptually prior.
Objection 3:
Argues that good is more universal than being, as it has the nature of being desirable, and non-being can also be desirable, making good conceptually prior.
Objection 4:
Argues that being is just one particular desirable thing, while good is something universally desirable, making good conceptually prior.
Contrary statement:
The Liber De Causis states that being is the first among creatures, implying that being is conceptually prior.
Response:
Argues that being is conceptually prior to good, as it is the first intelligible thing and the proper object of the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1:
Explains Dionysius' ordering of the divine names based on their causality and the distinction between matter and privation.
Reply to Objection 2:
Clarifies that good extends to existents and non-existents through causality, not predication, and that being implies only the condition of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 3:
Argues that non-being is not desirable in itself, but only per accidens, and that being is the proper object of desire.
Reply to Objection 4:
States that life, knowledge, and other desirable things are desired because they are actual, and ultimately, being is desired.

Article 3: Examines whether every being is good.
Objection 1:
Argues that good adds something to being, but things that add something to being limit it, implying that not every being is good.
Objection 2:
States that nothing evil is good, and some beings are called bad, implying that not every being is good.
Objection 3:
Claims that primary matter does not have the nature of something desirable, and therefore it does not have the nature of the good, implying that not every being is good.
Objection 4:
Points out that there is no such thing as the good among mathematical entities, which are beings, implying that not every being is good.
Contrary statement:
Affirms that every creature of God is good, implying that every being is good.
Response:
Maintains that every being, insofar as it is a being, is good, as every being has actuality and is in some sense perfect.
Reply to Objection 1:
Clarifies that good adds something to being in the sense of desirability and perfection, not in the sense of limitation.
Reply to Objection 2:
Explains that no being is called bad insofar as it is a being, but only insofar as it lacks some sort of being.
Reply to Objection 3:
States that primary matter is good only in potentiality, and has some participation in the good because of its very ordering or inclination toward the good.
Reply to Objection 4:
Points out that mathematical entities do not subsist as separate entities with their own esse, and therefore they do not have the good or the nature of the good.

Article 4: Investigates whether good has the nature of a final cause.
Objection 1:
Argues that good has the nature of a formal cause, as the good is praised as beautiful.
Objection 2:
Claims that good has the nature of an efficient cause, as the good is diffusive of its own esse.
Objection 3:
Points out that our existence is from God as an efficient cause, and God is called good, implying that good has the nature of an efficient cause.
Contrary statement:
Affirms that the good has the nature of a final cause, as that for the sake of which something exists is the end and the good of other things.
Response:
Maintains that good expresses the nature of an end, as the good is that which everything desires, and [being desired] has the character of an end.
Reply to Objection 1:
Clarifies that good and beautiful are the same in the subject, but differ conceptually, as good has to do with desire and the end, while beautiful has to do with the cognitive power and the formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2:
Explains that good is said to be diffusive of itself in the sense that the end is said to cause movement.
Reply to Objection 3:
States that the will has the end as its proper object, and so Augustine's statement has to do with final causality.

Article 5 explores whether the nature of the good consists of mode, species, and order.
Objection 1 argues that mode, species, and order are related to being, not good.
Objection 2 claims that if the nature of the good consists of mode, species, and order, there would be an infinite regress.
Objection 3 states that evil, which is a lack of mode, species, and order, does not destroy the good.
Objection 4 argues that some modes, species, and orders are called bad, so they cannot be the nature of the good.
Objection 5 states that not all good things have weight, number, and measure.
The contrary statement from Augustine argues that mode, species, and order are general goods in things made by God.
The response argues that the nature of the good consists of mode, species, and order, which are necessary for perfection and desirability.
Mode signifies the determination or commensuration of principles, species signifies the form, and order signifies the inclination to an end or action.
Reply to Objection 1 argues that mode, species, and order follow upon being only insofar as it is perfect and good.
Reply to Objection 2 argues that mode, species, and order are not subsistent things, but rather make other things both beings and good.
Reply to Objection 3 argues that evil is the privation of some esse, and does not destroy every mode, species, and order.
Reply to Objection 4 argues that a mode, species, or order is called bad when it is less than it ought to be or not proportioned to the things it should be proportioned to.
Reply to Objection 5 argues that the nature of light is said to be without number, weight, and measure by comparison to corporeal things.

Article 6 explores whether the good is appropriately divided into the noble (honestum), the useful (utile), and the pleasant (delectabile).
Objection 1 argues that good is not appropriately divided into the noble, the useful, and the pleasant because they are all found in just one category.
Objection 2 states that the three things are not opposites, so they cannot be used to make a division.
Objection 3 argues that the useful is good only for the sake of the pleasant or the noble, so it should not be divided off from them.
The contrary statement argues that Ambrose uses this division of the good in De Officiis.
The response argues that the division is appropriate because it is a division of the human good, and something is good insofar as it is desirable and is the terminus of a movement of desire.
The useful is that which is desirable in such a way that it terminates the movement of desire relatively speaking, the noble is that which is desired as the last point and wholly terminates the movement of desire, and pleasure is that which terminates the movement of desire in the sense of resting in the thing desired.
Reply to Objection 1 argues that the division in question belongs to the good in accord with its proper nature, not insofar as it is identical in subject with being.
Reply to Objection 2 argues that the division is not by means of opposite things, but rather by means of opposed concepts.
Reply to Objection 3 argues that the good is divided into the three types as something analogous that is predicated of them according to an ordering of the prior and the posterior.