Notes

Extensive medical phenotyping of nitroglycerin infusion brought on bunch headache assaults.
Rather, motor imagery alone can sufficiently explain the observed effects in both AO+MI conditions. This bears clear implications for the application of AO+MI procedures in sport and neurorehabilitation. Attachment theory, developed by Mary Ainsworth and John Bowlby about seventy years ago, has become one of the most influential and comprehensive contemporary psychology theories. It predicts that early social interactions with significant others shape the emergence of distinct self- and other-representations, the latter affecting how we initiate and maintain social relationships across the lifespan. A person's attachment history will therefore associate with inter-individual differences in emotional and cognitive mechanisms sustaining representations, modeling, and understanding of others on the biological and brain level. This review aims at summarizing the currently available social neuroscience data in healthy participants on how inter-individual differences in attachment associate with brain anatomy and activity across the lifespan, and to integrate these data into an extended and refined functional neuro-anatomical model of human attachment (NAMA). We first propose a new prototypical initial attachment pathway and its derivatives as a function of attachment security, avoidance, and anxiety. Based on these pathways, we suggest a neural attachment system composed of two emotional mentalization modules (aversion and approach) and two cognitive mentalization modules (emotion regulation and mental state representation) and provide evidence on their functionality depending on inter-individual differences in attachment. We subsequently expand this first-person social neuroscience account by also considering a second-person social neuroscience perspective comprising the concepts of bio-behavioral synchrony and particularly inter-brain coherence. We hope that such extended and refined NAMA can inform attachment theory and ultimately help devising new prevention and intervention strategies for individuals and families at risk for attachment-related psychopathology. The current study examined how social cognition - specifically, belief-state processing - changes across the lifespan, using a large sample (N = 309) of participants aged 10-86 years. Participants completed an event-related brain potential study in which they listened to stories involving a character who held either a true- or false-belief about the location of an object, and then acted in a manner consistent or inconsistent to this belief-state. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a true-belief, inconsistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than consistent outcomes. In contrast, when the character held a false-belief, consistent outcomes led to a more negative-going N400 waveform than inconsistent outcomes, indicating that participants interpreted the character's actions according to their own more complete knowledge of reality. Importantly, this egocentric bias was not modulated by age in an early time window (200-400 msec post-stimulus onset), meaning that initial processing is grounded in reality, irrespective of age. However, this egocentric effect was correlated with age in a later time window (400-600 msec post-stimulus onset), as older adults continued to consider the story events according to their own knowledge of reality, but younger participants had now switched to accommodate the character's perspective. In a final 600-1000 msec time window, this age modulation was no longer present. DC661 ic50 Interestingly, results suggested that this extended egocentric processing in older adults was not the result of domain-general cognitive declines, as no significant relationship was found with executive functioning (inhibitory control and working memory). Unequivocally demonstrating the presence of multisensory signals at the earliest stages of cortical processing remains challenging in humans. In our study, we relied on the unique spatio-temporal resolution provided by intracranial stereotactic electroencephalographic (SEEG) recordings in patients with drug-resistant epilepsy to characterize the signal extracted from early visual (calcarine and pericalcarine) and auditory (Heschl's gyrus and planum temporale) regions during a simple audio-visual oddball task. We provide evidences that both cross-modal responses (visual responses in auditory cortex or the reverse) and multisensory processing (alteration of the unimodal responses during bimodal stimulation) can be observed in intracranial event-related potentials (iERPs) and in power modulations of oscillatory activity at different temporal scales within the first 150 msec after stimulus onset. The temporal profiles of the iERPs are compatible with the hypothesis that MSI occurs by means of direct pathways linking early visual and auditory regions. Our data indicate, moreover, that MSI mainly relies on modulations of the low-frequency bands (foremost the theta band in the auditory cortex and the alpha band in the visual cortex), suggesting the involvement of feedback pathways between the two sensory regions. Remarkably, we also observed high-gamma power modulations by sounds in the early visual cortex, thus suggesting the presence of neuronal populations involved in auditory processing in the calcarine and pericalcarine region in humans. Mentalizing, conventionally defined as the process in which we infer the inner thoughts and intentions of others, is a fundamental component of human social cognition. Yet its role, and the nuanced layers involved, in real world social interaction are rarely discussed. To account for this lack of theory, we propose the interactive mentalizing theory (IMT) -to emphasize the role of metacognition in different mentalizing components. We discuss the connection between mentalizing, metacognition, and social interaction in the context of four elements of mentalizing (i) Metacognition-inference of our own thought processes and social cognitions and which is central to all other components of mentalizing including (ii) first-order mentalizing-inferring the thoughts and intentions of an agent's mind; (iii) personal second-order mentalizing-inference of other's mentalizing of one's own mind; (iv) Collective mentalizing which takes at least two forms (a) vicarious mentalizing adopting another's mentalizing of an agent (i.
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