Notes

[Research Progress on Pathogenesis associated with Genetic Real Crimson Mobile Aplasia---Review].
Involuntary autobiographical memories are memories of personal events that come to mind spontaneously-that is, with no conscious initiation of the retrieval process. Such spontaneously arising memories were long ignored in cognitive psychology, which generally has focused on controlled and strategic forms of remembering, studied in laboratory settings. Recent evidence shows that involuntary memories of past events are highly frequent in daily life, and that they represent a context-sensitive, and associative way of recollecting past events that involves little executive control. They operate by constraints that favour recent events and events with a distinct feature overlap to the current situation, which optimizes the probability of functional relevance to the ongoing situation. In addition to adults, they are documented in young children and great apes and may be an ontogenetic and evolutionary forerunner of strategic retrieval of past events. SKI II Findings suggest that intrusive involuntary memories observed clinically after traumatic events should be viewed as a dysfunctional subclass of otherwise functional involuntary autobiographical memories. Because of their highly constrained, situation-dependent and automatic nature, involuntary autobiographical memories form a distinct category of spontaneous thought that cannot be equated with mind wandering. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.Imaginal exposure, i.e. reducing fear using exposure to mental imagery, is a widely used psychological treatment technique for dysfunctional fears. Yet, little is known about its underlying neural mechanisms. The present study examines the neural basis of imaginal exposure using a novel experimental procedure consisting of repeated exposure to flashpoint mental imagery of phobic (spiders) and neutral (gloves) stimuli. Whether the 10 min long imaginal exposure procedure could reduce fear responses was examined one week later. Thirty participants fearful of spiders underwent the experimental procedure. Neural activity was assessed using functional magnetic resonance imaging (session 1). Subjective fear and skin conductance responses were measured throughout the study (sessions 1 and 2). Imaginal exposure evoked intense fear and heightened skin conductance responses, and indicated robust activation in several brain regions, including amygdala, midcingulate cortex and insula. Findings demonstrate that neural activity in fear-processing brain areas can be elicited solely by generating a mental image of a phobic stimulus, that is, in the absence of the percept. Relevant for treatment development, results reveal that a single 10 min session of brief exposures to flashpoint mental imagery can lead to lasting reductions in phobic fear at both the subjective and physiological levels. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.Cognition is not always directed to the events in the here and now and we often self-generate thoughts and images in imagination. Important aspects of these self-generated experiences are associated with various dispositional traits. In this study, we explored whether these psychological associations relate to a common underlying neurocognitive mechanism. We acquired resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging data from a large cohort of participants and asked them to retrospectively report their experience during the scan. Participants also completed questionnaires reflecting a range of dispositional traits. We found thoughts emphasizing visual imagery at rest were associated with dispositional tendency towards internally directed attention (self-consciousness and attentional problems) and linked to a stronger correlation between a posterior parietal network and a lateral fronto-temporal network. Furthermore, decoupling between the brainstem and a lateral visual network was associated with dispositional internally directed attention. Critically, these brain-cognition associations were related the correlation between parietal-frontal regions and reports of visual imagery was stronger for individuals with increased connectivity between brainstem and visual cortex. Our results highlight neural mechanisms linked to the dispositional basis for patterns of self-generated thought, and suggest that accounting for dispositional traits is important when exploring the neural substrates of self-generated experience (and vice versa). This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.Whether we are awake or asleep is believed to mark a sharp divide between the types of conscious states we undergo in either behavioural state. Consciousness in sleep is often equated with dreaming and thought to be characteristically different from waking consciousness. Conversely, recent research shows that we spend a substantial amount of our waking lives mind wandering, or lost in spontaneous thoughts. Dreaming has been described as intensified mind wandering, suggesting that there is a continuum of spontaneous experience that reaches from waking into sleep. This challenges how we conceive of the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness in relation to conscious states. I propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes different subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences independently of their occurrence in sleep or waking. I apply this framework to selected findings from dream and mind-wandering research. I argue that to assess the relationship between spontaneous thoughts and experiences and the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness, we need to look beyond dreams to consider kinds of sleep-related experience that qualify as dreamless. I conclude that if we consider the entire range of spontaneous thoughts and experiences, there appears to be variation in subtypes both within as well as across behavioural states. Whether we are sleeping or waking does not appear to strongly constrain which subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences we undergo in those states. This challenges the conventional and coarse-grained distinction between sleep and waking and their putative relation to conscious states. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.
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