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John Norton's The Material Theory of Induction bristles with fresh insights and provocative ideas that provide a much needed stimulus to a stodgy if not moribund field. I use quantum mechanics (QM) as a medium for exploring some of these ideas. First, I note that QM offers more predictability than Newtonian mechanics for the Norton dome and other cases where classical determinism falters. But this ability of QM to partially cure the ills of classical determinism depends on facts about the quantum Hamiltonian operator that vary from case to case, providing an illustration of Norton's theme of the importance of contingent facts for inductive reasoning. Second, I agree with Norton that Bayesianism as developed for classical probability theory does not constitute a universal inference machine, and I use QM to explain the sense in which this is so. But at the same time I defend a brand of quantum Bayesianism as providing an illuminating account of how physicists' reasoning about quantum events. Third, I argue that if the probabilities induced by quantum states are regarded as objective chances then there are strong reasons to think that fair infinite lotteries are impossible in a quantum world.This paper brings together two accounts of induction that appear to be in opposition John Norton's material account of induction (2003, 2010, manuscript) and Schurz' account of the universal optimality of meta-induction (2008, 2017, 2019). According to the material account of induction, all reliable rules of 'induction' are local and context-dependent. Here "induction" is understood in the sense of object-induction, i.e., induction applied at the object-level of events. In contrast, Schurz' account proceeds from the demonstration that there are universally optimal rules of meta-induction, i.e., rules of induction applied at the level of competing methods of prediction, including methods of object-induction. The two accounts are not in opposition; on the contrary, they agree on most questions related to the problem of induction. Beyond this agreement the two accounts are complementary the material account suffers from a justificational circularity or regress problem that the meta-induction account can solve. On the other hand, the meta-inductive account abstracts from domain-specific aspects of object-induction that are supplied by the material account.This paper investigates the functioning of the 'Copernican paradox' (stating that the Sun stands still and the Earth revolves around the Sun) in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, with particular attention to Edward Gresham's (1565-1613) little-known and hitherto understudied astronomical treatise - Astrostereon, or A Discourse of the Falling of the Planet (1603). The text, which is fully appreciative of the heliocentric system, is analysed within a broader context of the ongoing struggles with the Copernican theory at the turn of the seventeenth century. The article finds that apart from having a purely rhetorical function, the 'Copernican paradox' featured in the epistemological debates on how early modern scientific knowledge should be constructed and popularised. The introduction of new scientific claims to sceptical audiences had to be done both through mathematical demonstrations and by referring to the familiar concepts and tools drawn from the inventory of humanist education. As this article shows, Gresham's rhetorical techniques used for the rejection of paradoxicality of heliocentrism are similar to some of the practices which Thomas Digges and William Gilbert employed in order to defend their own findings and assertions.In this paper, I examine Cicero's oft-neglected De Divinatione, a dialogue investigating the legitimacy of the practice of divination. First, I offer a novel analysis of the main arguments for divination given by Quintus, highlighting the fact that he employs two logically distinct argument forms. Next, I turn to the first of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Here I show, with the help of modern probabilistic tools, that Marcus' skeptical response is far from the decisive, proto-naturalistic assault on superstition that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Then, I offer an extended analysis of the second of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Inspired by Marcus' second main argument, I formulate, explicate, and defend a substantive principle of scientific methodology that I call the "Ciceronian Causal-Nomological Requirement" (CCR). Roughly, this principle states that causal knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. Although I go on to argue that Marcus' application of the CCR in his debate with Quintus is dialectically inadequate, I conclude that De Divinatione deserves its place in Cicero's philosophical corpus, and that ultimately, its significance for the history and philosophy of science ought to be recognized.Computer simulations are involved in numerous branches of modern science, and science would not be the same without them. Yet the question of how they can explain real-world processes remains an issue of considerable debate. In this context, a range of authors have highlighted the inferences back to the world that computer simulations allow us to draw. I will first characterize the precise relation between computer and target of a simulation that allows us to draw such inferences. I then argue that in a range of scientifically interesting cases they are particular abductions and defend this claim by appeal to two case studies.In this paper, I raise some worries with John D. Norton's application of his material theory of induction to the study of analogical inferences. Skeptical that these worries can be properly addressed, I propose a principle to guide the philosophical research on analogical inferences and argue for its usefulness.The physiologist Claude Bernard was an important nineteenth-century methodologist of the life sciences. Selleck LDC7559 Here I place his thought in the context of the history of the vera causa standard, arguably the dominant epistemology of science in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Its proponents held that in order for a cause to be legitimately invoked in a scientific explanation, the cause must be shown by direct evidence to exist and to be competent to produce the effects ascribed to it. Historians of scientific method have argued that in the course of the nineteenth century the vera causa standard was superseded by a more powerful consequentialist epistemology, which also admitted indirect evidence for the existence and competence of causes. The prime example of this is the luminiferous ether, which was widely accepted, in the absence of direct evidence, because it entailed verified observational consequences and, in particular, successful novel predictions. According to the received view, the vera causa standard's demand for direct evidence of existence and competence came to be seen as an impracticable and needless restriction on the scope of legitimate inquiry into the fine structure of nature.
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