Notes

Quo Vadis - Opracowanie, Problematyka, Bohaterowie, Znaczenie Stopnia
Rob Clifton and Hans Halvorson (1999, 2002) argue that Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics can be seen as a special case of Bohr’s complementarity interpretation if it is assumed that all measurements ultimately reduce to positions measurement. The basic assumption behind quantum fundamentalism is that the structure of the formalism, in this case the wave function, corresponds to how the world is structured. So in every case where we have a subjective perception we must divide the world into the observed system and the observer. He argues that during a measurement the actual observer gets a subjective perception of what is going on that has a non-physical nature, which distinguishes it from the observed object and the measuring instrument. In other words, von Neumann argues that the observer can never be included in zaś type 2-process description, but the measuring instrument may sometime be part of a type 2-process, although it gives the same result with respect to the observed object (i). But there are ontological cost, which is significant to some. Originally Jeffrey Bub and Clifton (1996) were able to demonstrate (given some idealized conditions) that Bohr’s complementarity and Bohm’s mechanics fall under their uniqueness theorem for no-collapse interpretations.

After the 1950s a number of alternative interpretations to Bohr’s complementarity were articulated and they all found their proponents among physicists and philosophers of science. Although von Neumann’s and Wigner’s positions are usually associated with the Copenhagen Interpretation, such views were definitely not Bohr’s mistrz we shall see in zaś moment. Skorzystaj z okazji However, he holds on obecne psycho-physical parallelism as a scientific principle, which he interprets such that there exists a physical correlate to any extra-physical process of the subjective experience. For instance, he stated that already “the theory of relativity reminds us of the subjective character of all physical phenomena” (ATDN, p. Hence, when he occasionally mentioned the subjective character of quantum phenomena and the difficulties of distinguishing the object from the subject in quantum mechanics, he did not think of it as oraz temat confined to the observation of atoms alone. Moreover, the atomic object does not posses any state separate from the one it manifests at the end of the interaction because the measuring instrument establishes the necessary conditions under which it makes sense to use the state concept. Finally, when Bohr insisted on the use of classical concepts for understanding quantum phenomena, he did not believe, as it is sometimes suggested, that macroscopic objects or the measuring apparatus always have to be described in terms of the dynamical laws of classical physics.

The use of the classical concepts is necessary, according to Bohr, because by these we have learned to communicate to others about our physical experience. However, Bohr’s holism, according to which the measuring device and quantum object are in state of entanglement, is in objective tension with Bohr’s thesis of an ontological distinction, especially in virtue of the fact that by referring to the interaction between the quantum and the classical system as an irreversible physical process, Bohr seems to need a constructive approach to quantum mechanics that he wants to avoid. For instance, “Bohr believed in the fundamental and universal nature of quantum mechanics, and saw the classical description of the apparatus as i purely epistemological move, which expressed the fact that a given quantum system is being used as i measuring device” (Landsman 2007); and in oraz similar vein: “One is left with the impression from Bohr’s writings that the quantum-classical divide is a necessary part of the epistemological structure of quantum mechanics” (Schlosshauer and Camilleri 2008 (Other Internet Resources), 2015). So Klaas Landsman (2006, 2007) accepts Howard’s suggestion that Bohr is an ontological quantum fundamentalist but he rejects that Bohr should be considered an epistemological quantum fundamentalist.


Camilleri then shows how Heisenberg’s view of complementarity, in spite of Heisenberg’s own testimony, radically differs from Bohr’s. We just have to interpret the formulas correctly.” In spite of that there is no general agreement to what extent Bohr opposed quantum fundamentalism. Because if everything is quantum - and correctly described by quantum formalism (what else would it mean to call everything quantum?) - then a measurement ends up in a superposition whether we describe the apparatus classical or not. Thus, we may define quantum fundamentalism to be the position holding that everything in the world is essentially quantized and that the quantum theory gives us a literal description of this nature. Howard does not explain under which circumstances one can move from a quantum system-cum-measuring apparatus being in a non-separable state to oraz mixture of separated states. There exists, according to Bohr, no view from nowhere in virtue of which quantum objects can be described. It is also generally agreed that Bohr didn’t treat the classical world of the measuring instrument as epistemically separated from quantum object along the line of a microscopic and macroscopic division.

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