Notes

The Court departed from precedent by reviewing the exercise/manner of use of the prorogation power, rather than just determining its existence/scope. Past cases only assessed the binary question of whether a power existed, not substantive review.

By framing the issue as the scope of the power, the Court avoided the normally deferential standard of review for exercises of power. Some argue this was a strategic framing to enable less deferential scrutiny.

Including "reasonable justification" as part of assessing scope conflated the analysis of existence vs. exercise. This collapsed the intended distinction between definitional and review functions.

The Court enforced a political convention of accountability rather than just observing it, which it said in Miller I it could not do. Some argue it gave a convention legal force.

Imposing a requirement for the PM to justify prorogation shifted the normal burden of proof in judicial reviews.

Assessing purported justifications would have required the Court to engage in a political question beyond its proper role.

The decision lacked doctrinal coherence with the Inner House's focus on misconduct rather than review standards.

It introduced novel substantive limitations on an executive power with no clear historical precedent.

Styling the issue as scope allowed qualifying the prerogative based on reasonableness in an unprecedented way.

The reasoning and remedies went beyond the Court's traditional functions and risked aggravating separation of powers.