Notes

Washington's main concern in late 1960's and early 1970's: Moscow's growing expansion in the Mediterranean basin.

Washington's task: altercation of superpowers' position in the Middle Eastern region - undermining Soviet influence.

- Washington could not tolerate an Israeli defeat, but at the same time it was extremely important to avoid another Arab humiliation

-The White House could not become hostage to the Israeli Government. Therefore, the Americans were staying in close touch with all belligerents.

-Finally, the war had also been a good test for detente , for Kissinger thought that tension in the Middle East could easily escalate towards superpower confrontation without the new relationship with the Soviet

BUT

What the Americans really pursued, however, was to show the Arabs that Soviet weapons were useful to start a war, but not to regain territory. This could have been achieved only through a negotiation process with the Jewish State and with the United States playing the role of mediating power

Washington's aim: to regain the lost ground and make sure that some Arab State loosen its relationship with Moscow,

Dr. Kissinger's aim- to remove or at least to undermine Soviet influence from the Middle East by detaching Moscow's main ally in the area and turning it into the mainstay of the new Us Middle East policy.

Washington's method: Secretary Rogers believed that the White House could not afford to watch events without doing anything. Hence, the Americans had to cooperate with the Soviets to seek an overall settlement to Middle Eastern issues.

Kissinger's method: wanted to follow the opposite way. He thought that there was no need to rush and that any early initiative would produce no effective outcome. In short, he wanted to freeze the situation and let the Arabs realize the Soviet assistance's ineffectiveness.

The main point of friction within the Nixon Administration: the perception itself of the nature of the problem. The State
Department thought that the root of American difficulties was the
Arab-Israeli conflict over territory and once resolved that, the influence of radical Arabs and the Soviet role in the area would dwindle.

On the contrary, Kissinger's assessment was that Arab radicalism had five sources:
1) Israel's conquest of territory; 2) Israel's existence itself; 3) social
and economic troubles; 4) opposition to Western interests; 5) opposition to Arab moderate regimes.

- He believed that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute would affect only the first point, thus leaving all the others unsolved.
- Nor was he convinced that Soviet influence would inevitably be affected by a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- The United States needed not only to work out a solution, but also and above all to teach a lesson that key diplomatic progress in the Middle East was in its hands and in those of moderate local regime

Patience - Washington's best weapon