Notes

France's behavior is inherently contradictory. On one side, it wants to build an anti-American coalition. On the other side, coalition building simply on the basis of national self-interest is hard when dealing with a power the size of the United States. French recourse to multilateralism, ironic in the light of its Gaullist past and national imperatives, points to France's dilemma and its limits. France wants to build a concert of nations in which its own national sovereignty is guaranteed and its right to pursue its national interests is recognized.

Therefore, France behaves in a completely predictable fashion. It will resist the United States vigorously, seeking to limit its global, hegemonic power. It will seek to build coalitions with other nations. However, because it reserves the right to pursue its own national self-interest, the coalitions tend to dissolve -- leaving France to face the United States impotently or to pursue its national self-interest and make its peace with the United States.

France wishes more than anything to be sovereign. Its sovereignty, however, is insufficient to guarantee its national self-interest. By itself, it cannot control its destiny; it must be part of something greater. But in being part of something greater, the temptation to make that large thing uniquely French strains the edifice. Without that impulse, however, France's nightmare comes to the fore -- saving itself by losing itself to something more important than France. Paris' behavior is neither mysterious nor unpredictable. It is, however, incapable of shaping history. France is caught between decisions it cannot make.

Therefore, France's operational pattern is to resist anything that impinges on its understanding of its national interest. The problem is that its national interests cannot be achieved alone, and therefore it requires accommodation. Its national interest is torn between resistance and accommodation. This creates a pattern that is unsettling to all concerned. The Iraqis, who thought they could rely on France, will be surprised that France, in the end, ultimately will prove to be an ineffective defender. The United States, which sees France increasingly as an adversary, will be bemused as the country realigns itself and eventually claims -- and indeed will believe -- that it has always been in the last position it occupies.

For France, Iraq represents two national interests. First, it has direct national interests in Iraq -- oil, defense and other markets. Second, and more important, France understands that a U.S. occupation of Iraq would shift the global balance of power even more in the favor of the United States. It is therefore in the French national interest to resist. At the same time, all-out resistance is impossible. By the nature of its foreign policy, France finds it difficult to hold together coalitions. Standing alone, France cannot resist the United States, nor can it resist a rupture with the United States.

France will resist the United States with all of its might -- but recognizing the limits of its might, it ultimately will capitulate, formally or informally. France will carry out its policies on multiple levels -- opposing on one, cooperating on another. It will appear to be perfidious, as the current term would have it, but it is simply torn in multiple directions, torn by competing geography, dreams and nightmares. France will move very quickly in many directions during any crisis. In the end, it will wind up where it began. France appears insufferable, but it is merely trapped by geography and history.