Notes

The question about the neutrality in intercultural and, to focus the discussion even further, in moral dialogue can be directly and positively posed in the context of a debate or dialogue between various social, cultural, or religious groups in public discourse within a liberal democratic state, where the minimal aim is to achieve peaceful coexistence of these, despite disagreements on value issues and diversity cultural and religious traditions. Often, due to considerations related to the above-discusses misapprehension of secularization, some are calling for such a dialogue to be neutral or claim that neutrality or a neutral language are positive factors in such a dialogue. But, and how can we in such a situation speak to each other in a neutral way? How to find and establish such neutrality?
There are a number of different models and strategies on offer (Ackerman 1989; cf. Strahovnik 2012) The first strategy for establishing neutrality is to establish a fundamental point of agreement, which then forms the basis for neutrality. In dialogue, we should thus define what is acceptable to all participants, regardless of any remaining disagreements. This is therefore the determination of some sort of supreme value, which represents the common starting point of the dialogue. One proposal that is close to this model is Hobbes’s view on dialogue within the community with fear of death as a common starting point. This fear and avoidance of death thus becomes the basis for an agreed social order, where everyone is subordinate to the common sovereign authority. Such a supreme value overcomes others and prevails over them. The problem of such a proposed model is, of course, obvious and is related to the question of whether it is reasonable to assume that such a point can even be found and determined in the light of the deep plurality which we have attributed to the modern post-secular society. This open question reduces the initial feasibility of the first model or strategy