Notes

The disunity of Korea in the tenth century was short-lived and soon
the peninsula was reunited under the Wang Kŏn. He named the state
Koryŏ after Koguryŏ, the ancient state that ruled the northern part of the
peninsula as well as parts of Manchuria. The English name Korea is derived
from Koryŏ. The Wang dynasty he founded in 918 ruled all of the
peninsula for the better part of five centuries from 935 to 1392, making it
among the longer-reigning dynasties in world history and inaugurating
a sense of stability and continuity in Korean history. Under Koryŏ the
peoples of Korea became integrated into a single, distinctive culture and
society to a far greater extent than under Silla. In fact, it may not be too
much to say that a truly Korean society and ethnicity that was coterminous
to the state emerged during this time.
Toward the end of the ninth century and into the early tenth century as
centralized rule broke down, Korea became in effect a land where local
military warlords ruled. Considering the rugged mountainous terrain of
Korea, the strength of local traditions, and the great difficulty that even
the ablest of Silla’s rulers had in trying to create a centralized state in the
face of powerful aristocratic clans, the disintegration of the Silla is not
surprising. What is more surprising is how quickly Korea was reunified
in the tenth century under Wang Kŏn. Several factors help explain this.
Silla left a two-century legacy of unified, bureaucratic government that
may have become accepted as the norm. Furthermore, under the Silla
a strong cultural unity among the peoples of the peninsula emerged,
although it is difficult to gauge its extent or depth. Korea was also influenced
by outside events. The nomad threat posed by the Khitans (or
Qidan), a proto-Mongol group that emerged as dominant in Manchuria
in the tenth century, made the need for a centralized authority more
obvious. Korea may have also been influenced by the model of a strong
unified state that Tang presented, a model reinforced by the reunification
of China by the Song in 979.
Wang Kŏn’s new state was far from a strong centralized bureaucratic
state, however, but was rather an alliance of warlords. Much of the work
in creating a strong, centralized kingdom was left to his successors during
the next two centuries. It was a slow process of building effective state institutions
and creating an elite class that owed its prime allegiance to the
dynasty. The result was largely successful in that Wang and his successors
created a kingdom that lasted for nearly half a millennium and that
was inherited largely intact by the Yi dynasty that ruled for another five
centuries. Together the two dynasties ruled a state that forged its inhabitants
into one of the most homogeneous peoples in the world, a people
with a strong sense of cultural identity and historical consciousness.
Wang Kŏn’s base was in the Kaesŏng area, meaning the Imjin and
Yesŏng basin area and the adjacent coastal area. There is some doubt
about his real name, since Wang Kŏn simply means “kingly founder,”
but it is believed that he was from a prominent local family with military
and merchant connections. His grandfather reportedly was a merchant
and his father a military naval commander. The name Koryŏ suggests
that the new dynasty saw itself as a successor to the old Koguryŏ. Certainly
the name still symbolized power and greatness in Northeast Asia
at that time. Wang Kŏn established his capital at Kaesŏng, a more centrally
located city to the north of the Han River. Soon after establishing
his capital at Kaesŏng he made Pyongyang his secondary capital, naming
it Sŏgyŏng (Western Capital), further suggesting the link between
the once formidable state and the new kingdom. Perhaps he also sought
to draw upon the geomantic power of the ancient city as well. But Koryŏ
was strictly a peninsular state, possessing none of the Manchurian lands
of its earlier namesake.
Major changes in government and society took place that marked
Koryŏ as more than simply a change of ruling houses, yet there was also
a great deal of continuity. As the dynastic founder, Wang Kŏn sought to
underline this continuity and establish himself as the legitimate successor
to Silla. He did this by marrying into the Kyŏngju Kim family of Silla
and by incorporating many elite families of Silla into the power structure
of Koryŏ. Indeed it would be more accurate to consider Koryŏ as a reformulation
of the Silla state rather than a radical break in Korean history.
Wang Kŏn took great care to establish his state as the legitimate successor
to Silla, pensioning off the last king, appointing members of the Silla aristocracy
to positions in the new state, and taking two members of the Silla
royal family as consorts. Later Korean historians would largely accept
this claim that Koryŏ was the successor to Silla, and that the “Mandate of
Heaven” had simply been passed on to a new dynasty.
One of the dynastic founder’s primary tasks was to consolidate power
over a land where local families had their own powerful armies. In fact,
as historian John Duncan has pointed out, the early Koryŏ was as much
a confederation of powerful warlords and aristocratic families as a centralized
state.1 To establish his authority Wang claimed the Mandate of
Heaven, the Chinese practice in which authority was legitimized by asserting
that the ruler governed with Heaven’s blessing. His invocation
of Heaven’s authority is reflected in the reign name he chose, Ch’ŏnsu
(Heaven-Given). To further establish his authority he formed alliances
with powerful warlords and prominent members of the old Silla aristocracy,
including the Silla royal family, acquiring twenty-nine wives in
total. His death in 943 consequently created succession problems due to
the vast number of in-laws jockeying for power. Wang Kŏn’s philosophy
of government is summed up in his Ten Injunctions, which sought to
promote Buddhism as a protective cult and warned against appointment
of people from Paekche (see below). He sought the protection of
the spirits of the land and was concerned that Buddhism be supported.
His injunctions made it clear that while China was to be looked to as a
model, Korea had its own customs and should not imitate the Chinese
unnecessarily. In contrast to China, according to the injunctions, the
seminomadic tribal peoples of the north were barbarians and their customs
should never be copied at all.
The Wang court initially held little direct power over the countryside,
where control was in the hands of local lords with their private armies
and their walled towns. In realistic recognition of the entrenched power
of these lords, the central government appointed them as officials in
their home areas. Gradually the Koryŏ developed a kun-hyŏn (prefecturecounty)
system of local administration. Under this system, the more powerful
aristocrats headed yŏng (control prefectures) and control counties,
occupied the local offices in administrative units, and also collected taxes
from the less powerful families that held offices in the sok (subordinate
prefectures) and counties. It was an odd arrangement that had no Chinese
precedent. Most likely the system reflected the hierarchical order of local
aristocrats who actually governed the countryside. The bone-rank system
was replaced by the pon’gwan (ancestral-seat) system. Under this system,
aristocratic clans were identified by their place of origin. This clan-seat
system closely linked aristocrats with a particular area where they generally
held the key local offices.
The fragility of the new state was evident in the succession struggle
after Wang’s death. He named his eldest son, Mu, as his heir in 921. By
the time of Wang Kŏn’s death, Mu, who is better known as King Hyejong
(r. 943–945), had long prepared for the assumption of his father’s position.
Yet he had to defend his throne against Wang Kyu, one of the powerful
warlords with whom Wang Kŏn had sought alliances through marriage.
Wang Kyu (?–945) had married two daughters to Wang Kŏn and supported
a grandson by one of these marriages for the throne. Hyejong died
after only two years on the throne and his brother Chŏngjong (r. 945–949)
defeated Wang Kyu and ended the rebellion.2 But the private armies
threatened the stability of the state. To counter the private armies of great
aristocrats Chŏngjong created the Kwanggun (Resplendent Army), an
important step in consolidating royal power.
The fourth Koryŏ king, Kwangjong (r. 949–975), took further measures
to consolidate monarchical power. He created a large military force from
the provinces loyal to him, declared himself hwangje (emperor), and renamed
Kaesŏng the Imperial Capital (Hwangdo). This was an unusual
step, since Koreans generally accepted the idea that there was only one
emperor, the Chinese emperor. Not until 1897 would a Korean king
again claim the imperial title. The pretension was abandoned when the
Song dynasty was able to reassert Chinese authority in the region. In
956, Kwangjong issued a Slave Investigation Act aimed at determining
those who had been illegally or unfairly enslaved during the Later Three
Kingdoms period. During that time many peasants had been captured as
prisoners of war, while others had fallen into debt, and in both cases they
had become slaves. The king sought to reduce the power of the great lords
by limiting the number of their slaves and returning the freed peasants
to the tax rolls. Kwangjong also carried out bloody purges among the
high aristocracy. In 960, he launched a purge of powerful aristocrats who
held posts as Meritorious Subjects. Under Wang Kŏn and his immediate
successors many individuals who had aided or allied with the monarchs
as they established the new state or who helped them secure their throne
had been granted the post of Meritorious Subject as a reward. The purge
was designed to reduce their number and influence.
The next king, Kyŏngjong (r. 975–981), abandoned the imperial pretension
but strengthened the central government by issuing the chŏnsi-kwa
(Field and Woodland) system. This was a system by which officials were
given fixed incomes from designated lands according to rank. By providing
support for officials, the Field and Woodland system helped to transform
the government from an aristocratic confederation into a central bureaucracy
of officials recruited by and loyal to the throne.3 Another early step
in consolidating state power was carried out by Sŏngjong (r. 981–997), who
created among other institutions a Finance Commission (Samsa) to handle
financial affairs, the Hallim Academy to draft royal edicts, and an inspectorate,
the Ŏsadae, to check on the conduct of officials.
After early experiments with different types of institutions Koryŏ
adopted the Tang Three Chancelleries system. The Samsŏng (Three
Chancelleries) were the chief administrative organs of the Koryŏ state.
The Chungsŏsŏng (Secretariat) was responsible for drafting policy, the
Munhasŏng (Chancellery) reviewed policy, and the sangsŏsŏng (Secretariat
for State Affairs) was responsible for executing policies through the Yukpu
(Six Ministries). Following the Chinese practice the six ministries were
war, rituals (that included foreign affairs), finance, personnel, punishments,
and public works. Heads of the Secretariat of State Affairs were
often concurrently heads of the six ministries, but their positions were
less prestigious than those of the directors of the first two chancelleries.
The first two formed a Chungsŏ-Munhasŏng (combined Secretariat-
Chancellery) under a Munha-sijung (supreme chancellor), the highest of
all officials. Officials were divided Chinese-style into nine grades. At the
top of this hierarchy were the eight first- and second-grade officials of
the Chungsŏ-Munhasŏng, who become known as the chaesin or chaesang.
Another important organ was the Ch’ungch’uwŏn (Royal Secretariat, later
called the Ch’umirwŏn), which was responsible for military affairs and for
transmitting royal orders. The top-ranking officials of the Ch’ungch’uwŏn
formed a lesser elite group known as the ch’usin.
This complex system of administration was closely modeled on the
administration of Tang China. Indeed, Koryŏ adhered much more
closely to the Tang model of administration than Silla did. But in reality
Koryŏ functioned quite differently. In practice, the distinctions between
the various organs of government were less sharply defined than in
China. Furthermore, unlike China where members of nonaristocratic
families and eunuchs held key positions, the government of Koryŏ was
dominated by the members of the great pedigreed families. In what was
a common Korean pattern, effective decision making was carried out by
these men in the form of councils of high-ranking officials. These were
represented in the chaesin and ch’usin elite officialdom, who collectively
became known as the Chaech’u or Privy Council that met at joint sessions.
Later in the dynasty, the top council was called the Todang. The
Three Chancelleries were typical of the councilor organs that characterized
policy making and administration in premodern Korea. The desire
to achieve positions on the Three Chancelleries and to be able to participate
in the key Todang policy-making sessions led to intense competition
among the major aristocratic families.
Another characteristic of this system was civilian dominance. Military
officers were drawn from military lineages that had less prestige than
civilian lineages. The top military post was the sang changgun (grand
general), whose rank was only senior third-grade, lower than the
second-grade rank of the chaesin and ch’usin. In times of crisis civilians
were given military commands. The division of officialdom into civil
and military lines resulted in tensions that led to the political upheavals
of the twelfth century.
A significant innovation of the early Koryŏ was the introduction of
the kwagŏ or civil service examinations in 958. Until its abolition in 1894
this was a key institution in Korea for recruiting and appointing officials.
Although Silla experimented with civil service exams, they only became
significant when they were reintroduced in the tenth century. The civil
examination system was developed in China in the first centuries CE and
became an important avenue for recruiting officials under the Tang dynasty.
Its purpose was in part to free the Chinese emperors from reliance
on powerful aristocrats for their officials by selecting talented men from
the provinces. In theory the exams were open to all commoners, and in
practice, too, members of non-elite families often rose to high positions.
It was also based on the Confucian ideal that the state should be ruled by
men of merit. Although not all officials in China were recruited through
this method, it gradually came to undermine the power and status of the
old aristocracy, replacing it with a merit-based service elite of scholarofficials.
In Korea, the civil examinations were less a tool for the recruitment
of officials than a means of training members of the aristocratic elite
for government office. Thus they did not undermine the old landowning
aristocratic class but helped to transform it into a service nobility that
needed to validate its status by producing sons who scored well in the
state examinations.