Notes

the theory of the Ideas. What critics usually fail to see is that Sartre is one
of the very few twentieth century philosophers to present us with a total
system. One may at will accept or reject this system, but one is not justified in considering any of its parts in isolation from the whole. The
new insights which Sartre offers us are sufficiently basic to put all of the
familiar concepts in a wholly different light.
In a brief introduction I can not hope to deal with the mass of detailed
evidence neededto show the full scope of Sartre's thought, but I should
like to do two things: first, I think it would be profitable to consider
briefly earlier works of Sartre's which serve as a kind of foundation for the
fuller discussion in Being and Nothingness; second, I should like to discuss a few of the crucial problems presented in the latter work. In connection with the earlier writing, I shall be concerned only with those aspects
which seem to me to be significantly connected with fundamental positions in Being and Nothingness; in the second part I am making no
claim to presenting a full analysis or exposition of the book but merely
offering some general comments as to a possible interpretation of certain
central positions. '
In an article called "La Transcendance de I'Ego. Esqnisse d'nne description phenomenologique"4 (1936) Sartre, while keeping within the
general province of phenomenology, challenged Busserl's concept of the
transcendental Ego. The article does more than to suggest some of the
principal ideas of Being and Nothingness. It analyzes in detail certain
fundamental positions which though basic in the later work are there
hurriedly sketched in or even presupposed. Most important is Sartre's
rejection of the primacy of the Cartesian cogito. He objects that in Descartes' formula-"I think; therefore I am"-the consciousness which says,
"I am," is not actually the consciousness which thinks. (p. 92) Instead
we are dealing with a secondary activity. Similarly, says Sartre, Descartes
has confused spontaneous doubt, which is a consciousness, with methodical doubt, which is an act. (p. 104) When we catch a glimpse of an
object, there may be a doubting consciousness of the object as uncertain.
But Descartes' cogito has posited this consciousness itself as an object;
the Cartesian cogito is not one with the doubting consciousness but has
reflected upon it. In other words this cogito is not Descartes doubting;
it is Descartes reflecting upon the doubting. "I doubt; therefore I am"
is really "I am aware that I doubt; therefore I am." The Cartesian the theory of the Ideas. What critics usually fail to see is that Sartre is one
of the very few twentieth century philosophers to present us with a total
system. One may at will accept or reject this system, but one is not justified in considering any of its parts in isolation from the whole. The
new insights which Sartre offers us are sufficiently basic to put all of the
familiar concepts in a wholly different light.
In a brief introduction I can not hope to deal with the mass of detailed
evidence neededto show the full scope of Sartre's thought, but I should
like to do two things: first, I think it would be profitable to consider
briefly earlier works of Sartre's which serve as a kind of foundation for the
fuller discussion in Being and Nothingness; second, I should like to discuss a few of the crucial problems presented in the latter work. In connection with the earlier writing, I shall be concerned only with those aspects
which seem to me to be significantly connected with fundamental positions in Being and Nothingness; in the second part I am making no
claim to presenting a full analysis or exposition of the book but merely
offering some general comments as to a possible interpretation of certain
central positions. '
In an article called "La Transcendance de I'Ego. Esqnisse d'nne description phenomenologique"4 (1936) Sartre, while keeping within the
general province of phenomenology, challenged Busserl's concept of the
transcendental Ego. The article does more than to suggest some of the
principal ideas of Being and Nothingness. It analyzes in detail certain
fundamental positions which though basic in the later work are there
hurriedly sketched in or even presupposed. Most important is Sartre's
rejection of the primacy of the Cartesian cogito. He objects that in Descartes' formula-"I think; therefore I am"-the consciousness which says,
"I am," is not actually the consciousness which thinks. (p. 92) Instead
we are dealing with a secondary activity. Similarly, says Sartre, Descartes
has confused spontaneous doubt, which is a consciousness, with methodical doubt, which is an act. (p. 104) When we catch a glimpse of an
object, there may be a doubting consciousness of the object as uncertain.
But Descartes' cogito has posited this consciousness itself as an object;
the Cartesian cogito is not one with the doubting consciousness but has
reflected upon it. In other words this cogito is not Descartes doubting;
it is Descartes reflecting upon the doubting. "I doubt; therefore I am"
is really "I am aware that I doubt; therefore I am." The Cartesian cogito
is reflective, and its .object is not itself but the original consciousness
of doubting. The consciousness which doubted is now reflected on by the
cogito but was never itself reflective; its only object is the object which
it is conscious of as doubtful. These conclusions lead Sartre to establish
the pre-reflective cogito as the primary consciousness, and in all of his
later work he makes this his original point of departure.
Now it might seem at first thought that this position would involve
is reflective, and its .object is not itself but the original consciousness
of doubting. The consciousness which doubted is now reflected on by the
cogito but was never itself reflective; its only object is the object which
it is conscious of as doubtful. These conclusions lead Sartre to establish
the pre-reflective cogito as the primary consciousness, and in all of his
later work he makes this his original point of departure.
Now it might seem at first thought that this position would involve